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SDI AND "THE COMMON DEFENSE"
by Daniel 0. Graham*
A pretty good case can be made that President Ronald Reagan's Strategic
Defense Initiative, dubbed "Star Wars" by its detractors, will be illegal if ever
taken beyond laboratory experimentation. Illegality of the program is argued by
Soviet and some American detractors of SDI on the grounds that any development
of defenses against ballistic missiles beyond pure research violates a strict inter-
pretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 (ABM Treaty), and treaties
are to be regarded in U.S. jurisprudence as the supreme law of the land.
This very narrow interpretation of the wording or spirit of the ABM Treaty
is not generally held, but it appears that a narrow interpretation, disallowing
tests of spaceborne components of SDI, is being used by anti-SDI elements to
limit the extent of research on new defensive systems.
Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), a lawyer, made himself famous (or infamous
depending on one's political point of view) by maintaining that the Reagan
Administration would create a constitutional crisis by adopting a broad rather
than narrow interpretation of the language of the ABM Treaty in determining
the legality of SDI testing and development.
The ABM Treaty was written, negotiated and ratified on a very broad basis
of understanding on the part of American negotiators and ratifying Senators,
not a narrow one. The fundamental assumption which underpinned the Treaty
was that defenses against nuclear ballistic missiles were (a) infeasible because of
technological limitations and (b) undesirable because they destabilized a presum-
ably achievable nuclear standoff based on shared capabilities of the superpowers
to slaughter one another. The SDI program relies upon an opposite pair of
assumptions: (a) it is technologically possible to defend against nuclear ballistic
missiles and (b) such defenses are desirable and stabilizing since they destroy any
nuclear aggressor's confidence in the outcome of its aggression and remove the
possibility of nuclear war through accident or rogue nation attack.
There is simply no intellectually legitimate way to argue for both SDI and
the ABM Treaty, yet individuals on both sides of the issue have attempted to do
so. The Reagan Administration has lacked the political courage to point out the
incompatibility of the ABM Treaty and the goals of the SDI program. Anti-SDI
spokesmen have lacked the political courage to admit that their opposition has
nothing at all to do with the presumed legal sanctity of the ABM Treaty. In
fact, members of Congress opposed to SDI voted as a block for an amendment
to the authorization bill forcing the Defense Department to adhere to a strict
interpretation of the ABM Treaty on the same day that they voted unanimously
to condemn the Soviet Union for having violated that Treaty.
Director, High Frontier, Inc.; Lieut. Gen., U.S. Army (Ret.); former Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency. B.S., U.S. Mil. Acad., 1946. High Frontier is a non-profit organization
devoted to the research of strategic defense issues.
Journal of Legislation
"Strategic Defense Initiative" is a typically unhelpful set of words assembled
by the federal bureaucracy that tends to mask the fact that a fundamental shift
is taking place in U.S. nuclear strategy. SDI harnesses the postnuclear techno-
logical revolution (whose wonders include supercomputers, superconductors, and
supersensors) to solve the practical dangers and moral and legal dilemmas
stemming from the "mutual assured destruction" strategy adopted a quarter
century ago by the superpowers.
The policy shift has grown profound. The old paradigm held that we cannot
and should not defend the nation in the nuclear era. The new paradigm concludes
that we can and we must defend the nation. Advocates of the old paradigm must
wrestle with both the inexorable advances of technology and the unsophisticated
but automatic preference of ordinary people for protection over sheer vengeance.
It would appear that the anti-SDI forces face a hopeless task. On the
technical side they must argue that "it can't be done" while scientists and
engineers prove that it can. On the moral side they must argue that it is better
to be prepared to kill Soviet citizens than to defend our own. On the legal side
they must argue that a treaty that has been violated by the Soviets takes precedence
over the constitutional mandate that the federal government "provide for the
common defense."
That is a hard sell. It would be impossible if it were not for the institutional
biases favoring the old paradigm. The Pentagon and many of the makers of
modern weaponry are comfortable within the old offense-only paradigm. No part
of the Defense Department, including the Strategic Defense Initiative Organiza-
tion, has the mission of preventing the impact on the United States or any of
its allies of a nuclear ballistic missile. The new paradigm is apparently highly
unsettling to much of the national security bureaucracy.
Then there is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
It is perfectly obvious that the best defenses against nuclear attack will be those
based in space. But this proposition causes much turf guarding heartburn in
NASA. SDI suggests military encroachment on NASA civilian programs. Many
in NASA (with the notable and encouraging exception of Director James Fletcher
and former Deputy Hans Mark) actually believe that some palpable difference
exists between space technology with military and non-military applications.
The old paradigm advocates have an even more powerful ally-the Democrats
who control the United States Congress. Too many Democratic politicians have
been influenced by the nuclear freeze movement. Democrats who should have
known better yielded to the pressures of the strongest political thrust ever based
on the old paradigm. "Freeze or fry" was the battle cry-and it worked for a
while.
It worked until SDI came along. And then it collapsed-why? Because SDI
exposed its false dilemma. SDI offered a more attractive way to cut the nuclear
Gordian knot by utilizing the United States' technological superiority. Within six
months of President Reagan's March 1983 "Star Wars" speech, the nuclear
freeze movement had effectively collapsed.
For Democratic politicians dependent for re-election upon the support of the
pacifist left, SDI has presaged disaster for their political ambitions. These
politicians enjoy positions on committees of Congress which give the old paradigm
supporters a chance to scuttle SDI.
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By far the most effective proponent of the old paradigm and the most
effective enemy of SDI outside the Soviet Union is the Republican-Democratic
team that formulates our arms control policy-George Shultz and Paul Nitze.
These two individuals have jeopardized the SDI movement. They have proposed
the elimination of the "withdrawal with notice" clause of the ABM Treaty and
the addition of a U.S.-Soviet agreement not to withdraw from the Treaty for
seven to ten years. Nothing could be more deadly to SDI. If Shultz and Nitze
can stall deployment of SDI through negotiations with the Soviets, the bureauc-
racies and Congress will have an easier job of dismantling development and
testing programs.
The primary political wrestling match of the late 1980's, at least in the arena
of foreign affairs and national security, has focused on SDI. If the debate
continues as it has over the past several years, anti-SDI politics will be charac-
terized by shrillness, phony "science" and a deplorable disregard for veracity-
all common characteristics of arguments for a lost cause. Furthermore, the anti-
SDI camp will be constantly embarrassed by the precise correlation between their
views and those of our Soviet rivals. On legal matters, they will insist that the
ABM Treaty is the law of the land. However, in the end they will lose to those
who point to the Preamble to the Constitution, and its firm instruction to
"provide for the common defense."
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